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Alongside Foundationalism: Adventism’s
Alternative Protestant
Philosophical Path
Nicholas Miller1
Andrews University

Postmodernism presents most American conservative evangelical churches
with the following challenge and dilemma: If the modernism that was pervasive
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries served as the philosophical and
epistemological basis for the formulation and expression of the doctrinal
statements and frameworks of most modern American denominations,
what happens to those doctrinal frameworks when postmodernism reveals
the flaws and fallacies of that modernistic foundation? If those doctrinal
frameworks can be salvaged, it can only be, postmoderns would argue, by a
significant reworking of them in light of the postmodern critique. How are
modern, biblically conservative evangelicals to respond to this challenge?
In good postmodern tradition, we will begin with a narrative. The
current state of engagement of conservative evangelical thought with
postmodernism can be illustrated by the story of a recent church conference
on postmodernism and the mission of the church. The conference was held
at Andrews University in October of 2012.2 Andrews is operated by the
Seventh-day Adventist Church, whose particular doctrinal formulations, like
many American denominations, have their roots in the religious revivals of
the Second Great Awakening of the early nineteenth century.
Thus, the Andrews conference provides an insight into how broader
conservative evangelicalism is grappling with these issues, especially as it
was attended by evangelical participants and presenters from a variety of
faith traditions. Three major points emerged from the conference that can
help guide the church in its future engagements with postmodernism and
secularism. The first two points received a general consensus of support, but
the third point was contested. It is the disagreement on the third point that
provides this article with its focus.
The first point of agreement was that postmodernism is at least two
things; the first being an intellectual, ideological approach to reality, often
associated most strongly with certain French post-structural intellectuals
after World War II, who critiqued the universalist and absolutist claims of
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modernity associated with the Enlightenment project of seeking for universal
and objective truths.
The other thing that postmodernism consists of is a cultural mood,
or attitude, that harbors skepticism to all forms of authority, privileges the
individual’s subjective experiences, and opposes any claim to universal truths
or a “meta-narrative” that embraces humanity.
It was acknowledged that many people who have never heard of poststructuralism, Foucault, or Derrida, nevertheless live with a postmodern
attitude or perspective. Indeed, this would seem to be the prevailing cultural
sense in most centers of education and urbanism in the West, and increasingly
in other countries around the world.
The second point of commonality at the conference was that whatever
the merits or demerits of postmodernism are as an ideology—and most
presenters were quite critical of it—the existence of the cultural form of
postmodernism requires a response and recognition from Adventist missions.
As the keynote speaker, Dr. John Stackhouse, put it, like any culture we
try to reach, postmodernism has its good points and bad points; but for the
missionary, the most important point is that it is—and if we want to reach
people impacted by it, we must learn to communicate with their concerns,
sensitivities, and values in mind. The manner and style with which the biblical
message is delivered needs to be revised to make it more relational, modest,
and dialogical, at least when targeting postmodern populations.
The third, and more contested, point of the conference was the question
of how the church in its mission should respond to the intellectual, substantive
claims and critique of postmodernism. There was at least partial agreement
on this point. Most participants seemed to accept that postmodernism was
relatively accurate in its critique of the excesses of modernity, with its claims
to objectivity, absolutism, and universality.
The main point of contention came in relation to how the church
should connect its own theology and beliefs to the claims of the postmodern.
There were a minority of voices that seemed to be calling for a recasting of
Adventist theology and biblical study in light of the claims of postmodernity.
These voices argued that Adventist theology was developed in the context of
principles of modernism, and that it thus suffers from the same excesses and
absolutism of the modern project. Thus, they reasoned, not only the style and
approach of message delivery needs adjusting, but the message itself needs
modification in light of postmodern insights.
The majority of speakers, though, appeared to reject this approach.
As one speaker put it, we need to have churches that are sensitive to the
postmodern seeker, but the churches themselves, and the content of their
messages, should not become postmodern. Most of the plenary speakers were
clear on the point that the Christian gospel does contain a meta-narrative,
and that this should not and cannot be denied. The question is how best to
communicate it to the postmodern skeptic.
Still, the majority of speakers did not seem to have a clear response to
the question raised as to what paradigm alternate to either postmodernism

Alongside Foundationalism

39

or modernism the church’s message could be framed in. Indeed, one of the
main speakers suggested that a number of scholars believe that the Adventist
approach to Scripture has been rooted in the Enlightenment suppositions
undergirding modernism, thus making it vulnerable to the postmodern
critique.3
If all agreed that postmodernism did make an effective critique
of modernism, yet most were unwilling to base Adventist theology on
postmodernism, where did that leave the church? This question was raised,
and there was no clear response. One was left with the sense that we should
retreat to some kind of chastened, less aggressive modernism. But no principle
was provided that would help distinguish this “humble” modernism from
the modernism associated with colonial excesses and wars of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. The message to do modernism better, with more
restraint, does not provide enough detail on which to build a system of belief
or theology.
This article proposes to help answer the question of what framework
of knowledge can be used by Adventists, as well as other conservative
evangelicals, to construct their message that avoids the modern/postmodern
conundrum. It draws on the history of a philosophical movement that
developed in parallel with the foundationalism typically associated with
Western modernism.
It was a framework that reached a zenith in later colonial and early
republican America; was part of the undergirding of the religious thought
of the Second Great Awakening of the early nineteenth century; provided
the philosophical framework for the many revival and restorationist groups
coming out of that Awakening, including the Adventist church; and then
faded from American Protestant thought in the late nineteenth century, and
from Adventism in the early part of the twentieth century.4
One could call this framework a version of modernism, as it did have
Enlightenment influences. But it also had more conventionally religious
roots and was really an amalgamation, or coproduction, of certain strands of
Enlightenment and religious, typically dissenting Protestant, thought.5 It did
D. J. B. Trim, “Watchmen over the flux of thought: Foucault, Barthes, Derrida,
and the historical development of postmodernist philosophy” (paper, presented at
the conference “Revisiting Postmodernism: An Old Debate on a New Era,” Andrews
University, October 18-20, 2012), 20.
4
This framework has been discussed in overview and general detail in a number
of works, such as Mark Noll, American’s God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 93-113; Henry F. May, The Enlightenment
in America (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976), 307-362; Sydney E. Ahlstrom, “The
Scottish Philosophy and American Theology,” Church History 24.3 (Sep., 1955): 257272. These works sketch the general rise and influence of Scottish Common Sense
philosophy, though they leave generally unexplored the varying strands of how that
thought contributed to both foundationalist and nonfoundationalist epistemologies.
3
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not represent a complete break with the premodern era, but a modification
and continuation, and it itself had multiple facets, not all of which were
accepted by those groups influenced by it.6
But it was distinctly different from twentieth-century modernism so as
to not, in my opinion, be susceptible to the main thrust of the postmodern
critique. Now, the important practical point here is that if much of lateeighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century evangelical theology, including
Adventism, was constructed on this other, alternate system of early modern
thought, then it does not need to radically or even significantly reconstruct
or restructure its belief system to take into account the postmodern critique.
Admittedly, there will still need to be some modifications. Certainly,
evangelical and Adventist doctrine in the twentieth century has been
influenced and even shaped to some degree by the foundationalisms of both
the liberal and fundamentalist strands of Christianity. But while this streak of
both liberal and fundamentalist modernism exists in Adventism, it is largely an
accretion of the early-to-mid-twentieth century. Adventism’s underpinnings
rest, in my opinion, on a different set of philosophical assumptions.
I. Liberalism and Fundamentalism: Twin Products of
Philosophical Foundationalism
Nancey Murphy, in her book Beyond Liberalism & Fundamentalism: How Modern
and Post-Modern Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda, reveals the irony that the
apparently warring twentieth-century religious ideologies of theological
liberalism and fundamentalism are both based on the same, nonscriptural
epistemological basis of Cartesian foundationalism.7
Murphy argues that, in essence, the Cartesian ideal is that all knowledge
we commit to must be based on “indubitable foundation.” It posits knowledge
bases that are immune from challenge, absolutely certain, and from which we
can build our system of beliefs. The fundamentalists found this absolute basis
of certainty externally in an inerrant, verbally inspired Bible that they believed
could meet this standard of certainty. The liberals found their certainty
internally, in the individual’s religious experiences and feelings. Murphy argues
Thomas Aquinas, Richard Hooker, and John Locke, in “whose shadow the entire
movement flourished.” Ahlstrom, 259.
6
Mark Noll distinguishes epistemological, ethical, and methodological strands
within the Common Sense Tradition, with various strands being accepted, emphasized,
or rejected by various groups at different times in American history. These distinctions
become important below as we explore how different groups impacted by Common
Sense moved either away or toward a philosophically foundationalist outlook. Mark
A. Noll, “Common Sense Traditions and American Evangelical Thought,” American
Quarterly 37, 2 (Summer 1985): 220-223.
7
Nancy Murphy, Beyond Liberalism & Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern
Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996),
11-35.
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that both the fundamentalist and liberal systems end up misusing the Bible
because of their adherence to this problematic philosophical system.
Murphy’s framework has helped guide my telling of the story in my
church history courses of the rise of modern philosophy and its connection
to conservative and liberal Christianity. But in telling this story of Christianity’s
twentieth-century bifurcation, I believe that Murphy’s narrative would be
helped by a small modification, an enrichment at least, in the telling of its
historical roots. This nuancing of the story opens up space to understand a
version of Protestant philosophy that was not quite the same, in my opinion,
as the modern foundationalism effectively critiqued by postmodernism.
Murphy includes in her book a simple yet helpful chart that gives a quick
historical overview of the development of foundationalism and its relation to
modern Christianity. It looks like this:
		

Reid

		
Descartes
		
		

Locke

Princeton Theology

Fundamentalism

Hume
Kant

Schleiermacher

Liberalism

This chart is very helpful in understanding the common foundationalist
roots to the otherwise competing systems of theological fundamentalism and
liberalism. But my study of these thinkers has led me to believe that this
story can be helpfully complicated a bit, by recognizing a major difference
between some of these thinkers over the role that “certainty” plays in reliable
knowledge.
II. John Locke, Probabilism and Judgment
In my work on religious liberty, I spent quite a bit of time dealing with John
Locke and his works on knowledge and epistemology.8 While elements of
Locke seem somewhat modern and even foundationalist, he actually differs
quite a bit from Descartes and Hume in not emphasizing “the universal, the
timeless, the theoretical,” as Murphy describes the foundationalists. Rather,
he is much more concerned with the “particular, the timely, the practical,” as
Murphy characterizes nonfoundational, premodern thought.9

Nicholas Miller, The Religious Roots of the First Amendment (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012).
9
Murphy, Beyond Liberalism, 13.
8
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There is one more word that characterized Locke’s thought—
“probability,” which stands in contrast to certainty. As Locke himself put
it, “Probability, rather than knowledge, must be our guide in most of the
affairs of life. . . . ‘Our business here is not to know all things, but those
which concern our conduct.’ Therefore it is practical knowledge which is the
truly valuable part of knowledge.”10 In Locke’s view, the objective is not to
achieve absolute certainty, but to understand the side on which the balance of
evidence lies, and to act accordingly.
This is a very different mode and mindset from that of Descartes. It is
not just the rationalist/empiricist divide that separated Locke from Descartes.
In addition, Locke also differed with Descartes over that central element
of foundationalism, at least as Murphy and others describe it, the need for
indubitable foundations, or absolute certainty.
These observations about Locke’s non-Cartesian bent toward practicality
and probability were underscored by Locke scholar Douglas Casson in his
recent book Liberating Judgment: Fanatics, Skeptics, and John Locke’s Politics of
Probability.11 Casson portrays Locke as blazing a middle pathway between the
“skepticism of Montaigne and the foundationalism of Descartes.”
Both these systems were the opposite sides of the same coin, somewhat
like the fundamentalism and liberalism of our day; they were both based
on a desire for certainty and led to a “political quietism.” Both deferred to
traditional authorities, one in the name of the authority of tradition, the other
on a belief in a centralized moral certainty.12
While the young Locke was something of a traditionalist and absolutist,
the more mature Locke avoided both of these extremes by his foray into
notions of probability, judgment, and reasonableness.13 Locke believed that
most belief was that of probability, rather than absolute knowledge. The
areas of probability included scientific, moral, and religious beliefs, to which
he gave a similar status of probability and reliability. (Ironically, the field of
actual knowledge, while very small, included religious beliefs such as the
existence of God and His right to receive worship.)
Locke’s critical move was to recognize the role of internal judgment in
coming to an understanding and acceptance of truth. This role of probability,
giving importance to the internal reflections and judgments of each person, is
what sets Locke’s philosophy quite distinctly apart from Descartes and what I
would call the absolute foundationalists.
It was this internal role and deliberation necessary to making judgments
about knowledge, I believe, that caused Locke to value freedom of thought
and religion as he did. But it also puts him in a different path and trajectory
than that of foundationalism as set out by Murphy. Instead, Casson puts
Locke in a different genealogy, one going back through a series of Protestant
John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I.I.6.
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).
12
Ibid., 21-22.
13
Miller, Religious Roots, 64-67.
10
11
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thinkers who emphasized notions of the importance of personal, internal
judgment, and even experience in matters of religion.
I have previously written about Locke’s encounter with the thought of
dissenting Protestant thinkers who emphasized the internal role of the Holy
Spirit in prompting people to come to religious judgments and decisions.
These included Baptists, Quakers, and other Protestant dissenters. While
direct cause cannot be proven, it is very interesting that it was during and
after being exposed to these ideas of religious judgment that he developed
a philosophical version that was very similar to these religious approaches.14
Casson also sees religious precursors to Locke’s thought on probability
and judgment. These included the thinkers of the Great Circle of Tew, of
which William Chillingworth was a member. Chillingworth was the author
of The Religion of the Protestants, a work that emphasized the role of private
judgment and practical reason in arriving at scriptural truths. Another
precursor was Hugo Grotius, the Arminian remonstrant who authored the
first modern Christian apologetic, The Truth of the Christian Religion. In it, he
appealed to the “nondemonstrable facts of history” whereby persons might
show the “moral certainty” or “probability” of religious truth.15
After Locke we have the continuation of the school of probability
or practical certainty in the work of Scottish clergyman and philosopher
Thomas Reid. Reid was the most notable force behind the school of Scottish
Common Sense philosophy; a system that made claims about epistemology,
reason, and ethics grounded in common human experience.16
Reid’s view of the practicality of knowledge is captured in the title of
“common sense” that is attached to his philosophy. The phrase did not mean
that all things widely or commonly believed are true. Rather, it is the view that
certain truths about humans and reality must be true for rational discourse to
take place at all. Thus these truths must be “common” to all.
These essential truths would include the idea that our perceptions of
material things are reasonably reliable, that words convey some kind of
meaning, that other rational minds do exist. Without assuming these things,
no attempt at rational discourse is possible. Since even those that deny these
things, or say that they cannot be proved, use words and discourse to do so,
even they assume them to be true. Thus, our senses of these foundational
truths are common and shared.17
Miller, Religious Roots, 67-72.
Ibid., 113.
16
Some important recent works about Reid and his contributions to Scottish
Common Sense philosophy include, Terence Cuneo, René van Woudenberg, eds., The
Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004);
John Haldane, Stephen L. Read, eds., The Philosophy of Thomas Reid: A Collection of
Essays (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid
and the Story of Epistemology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
17
Ronald E. Beanblossom, ed., Thomas Reid: Inquiry and Essays (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1983), xliv-xlvi.
14
15
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The practical concerns of his system caused him to accept as valuable
knowledge that which was less than absolutely certain and fully demonstrable.
As one Reid scholar put it, “Reid rejects the claim that we can only be said
to know for certain in those cases where it is logically impossible to be
mistaken; it is not the case that the only demonstrative knowledge constitutes
knowledge.”18 Another framed it thus: “Epistemologically, it would appear
that we know things only on a common sense level with a type of practical
certainty, rather than any ‘absolute’ certainty.”19
Reid himself wrote that “philosophers consider probable evidence, not
as a degree, but as a species of evidence, which is opposed, not to certainty,
but to another species of evidence, called demonstration.” Reid is particularly
concerned to reject Hume’s argument that all knowledge is merely probability,
and therefore not true knowledge.20 For these reasons, one Reid scholar has
described Reid as “Locke purged and Locke re-created. It is only a mild
exaggeration to say that Reid’s system is a critical reconstruction of Locke.”21
III. Modern Probabilism and Scottish Common Sense:
An Alternative to Hard Foundationalism
Based on these observations about Locke and the stream of probabilism he
inherits and transmits, I would propose an alternate or parallel genealogy to that
sketched by Murphy. It is one of a modern probabilism that runs parallel with
modern foundationalism. This probabilism22 differs from foundationalism
in both holding to a different standard of reliability, probability rather than
certainty; and also in its willingness to base truths on multiple sources, such
as reason, experience, and nature as well as Scripture.

Ibid., xliv.
Elmer H. Duncan, ed., Thomas Reid’s Lectures on Natural Theology (1780)
(Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981), xxxxv.
20
Ibid., xiv.
21
G. A. Johnson, “Introduction,” Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common
Sense (Chicago: Open Court, 1915), 15.
22
Some may call it a “soft foundationalism,” but that would be to mischaracterize
it. Not only does it differ from traditional foundationalism in its acceptance of
probability rather than certainty, but it also allows for multiple sources and resources
for truth, versus the one source allowed for by foundationalism, whether it be
empiricism, rationalism, or Scripture and revelation.
18
19
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I would re-draw this historical genealogy to look something like this:
Romanticism/Idealism/Dualism

		
			

Foundationalism

Schleiermacher

Descartes

Liberalism

			
Kant

Hume

Empiricism/Positivism/Deism

			
			

Priestly

		

Jefferson

Unitarianism		

			Propositional Certainty
			
Later “Princeton Theology”
Fundamentalism

Probabilism

Grotius

Locke

Reid

Early “Princeton Theology”

			
			

Evidentiary Experientialism			
New School Presb.

Finney/Barnes

This new chart more accurately reflects that John Locke and Scottish
philosopher Thomas Reid were really in significant opposition to many of
the central ideas of Hume and Kant, most especially the latter’s need for
certainty and corresponding denial that moral or value truths could come
from examining the natural world. This chart would work better in three
dimensions, with the ends curved in a circle to show the empiricism of
Priestly and Jefferson approaching near the propositional certainty of the later
Princeton school; and the evidentiary experientialists of the New Schoolers
abutting the Romantic idealism of Schleiermacher and the liberals.
As Thomas Reid’s Common Sense philosophy developed in America, its
epistemological strand stayed vital among many and varied religious groups,
but its ethical, natural moral philosophy side was in good part rejected by those
that developed the nineteenth-century Princeton theology. This rejection of
natural sources of truth led to a kind of foundationalism, as the Princeton
school embraced a single-source of absolute truth—the verbally-inspired,
inerrant Scriptures. This move pushed them towards the foundationalism of
the Deists and Unitarians, but with a different foundation, that of Scripture,
rather than reason applied to the natural world.
The continued use of ethical Common Sense by the New Haven
theologians and New School Presbyterians caused them to continue to value
both natural morality and sense experience as a bridge to and supplement for
Scripture. This combination, which I term evidential experientialism, caused
this group to have greater communality with the romantics and idealists. This
similarity caused some to see the New School as the forerunners of modern
liberal theology. While there may be some overlap between the two groups,
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for the most part the New School thinkers continued to embrace natural
morality and the truth of Scriptural propositions in a manner very different
from that found in idealism, the main source of theological liberalism.
Thus, the top of the chart and the bottom are actually closer to each
other than those in the middle, which a three-dimensional chart could show.
Further, in putting Locke and Reid in the same row, one must acknowledge
that they had some significant differences with each other, especially on the
question of ideas in the role of knowledge. But on the point of probability as
sufficient for knowledge and beliefs, and on the belief in multiple sources of
truth, they were in agreement.
IV. Ethical Scottish Common Sense, Natural Law, and Intuition
An important point that characterizes Scottish common-sense philosophy for
Christian theology and thinkers is the validity of knowledge attainable from
God’s second book of nature. Apart from his works on the philosophy of
knowledge and epistemology, Thomas Reid also lectured on the importance
of natural theology, or truths about God, morality, and humanity discoverable
from observations of the natural world.23
This view of multiple sources of truth, with one source often confirming
or supporting another (intuition, supporting reason, overlapping in places with
Scripture) also distinguishes this common sense, probabilistic philosophical
approach from Cartesian foundationalism.24
That “absolute certainty” could not be achieved through these
probabilistic methods, either for law or ethics, did not prevent their use for
both. Unlike either Humean skepticism, or Kantian dualism, the Scottish
thinkers continued to posit a connection between the natural world and moral
or ethical beliefs and ideas. It is not a coincidence that the eighteenth-century
Scottish enlightenment produced some of the primary Protestant works on
natural law and natural morality, including those of Thomas Reid, Francis
Hutchinson, Lord Kames, and Adam Smith.25
23
Elmer H. Duncan, Ed., Thomas Reid’s Lectures on Natural Theology (1780)
(Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981).
24
An analogy to Scottish common sense ideas in the world of theology would
be the Weslyan quadrilateral, where four sources of authority, scripture, reason,
experience, and tradition, mutually support and verify each other in a series of
overlapping encounters. The fact that Scripture is the senior partner in the enterprise
(prima scriptura) and the sole basis of Christian doctrine (sola scriptura), cannot
obscure the underlying truth that this system is based on an epistemology that shows
a belief in multiple sources of truth, in which each source needs the support and
affirmation of other sources to be viewed as reliable or verified. Whidden, Woodrow
W., “Sola Scriptura, Inerrantist Fundamentalism, and The Wesleyan Quadrilateral: Is
‘No Creed but The Bible: A Workable Solution?’”Andrews University Seminary Studies 35,
no. 2 (Autumn 1997), 211-226.
25
Thomas Ahnert, The Moral Culture of the Scottish Enlightenment 1690-1805 (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 1-3, 87.
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The natural law and rights ideas of Jefferson and Madison in colonial
America reflect both Lockean and Scottish Enlightenment views of
the meaningfulness of the natural law, of natural rights, which is a kind
of morality, that can be derived from that law. But the ideas of Reid and
Hutchinson found probably their most influential advocate in America in the
form of John Witherspoon, Scottish Presbyterian pastor turned president of
the College of New Jersey, the forerunner of Princeton.26
Witherspoon served at early Princeton from 1768-1794, firmly
establishing the school in the Scottish enlightenment views of epistemology
and natural philosophy. He accomplished this in good part by personally
teaching the capstone course, entitled simply “Moral Philosophy,” that all
students took in their senior year. In this course, Witherspoon set out a view
of morality and ethics that could be understood and supported from reason.
As he put it, the class was called moral “philosophy, because it is an enquiry
into the nature and grounds of moral obligation by reason, as distinct from
revelation.”27
Witherspoon’s commitment to a reasoned morality did not “arise from
a rejection or disfavor of special revelation.” To the contrary, Witherspoon
taught that “the discoveries of reason cannot be contrary to the Bible and that
there is nothing certain or valuable in moral philosophy, but what is perfectly
coincident with the scripture.”28 But moral philosophy was a vital addition to
Scripture, because it provided the framework, the web, which could connect
all the disciplines outside divinity, whether it be political science, or history, or
the natural sciences, to the larger world of moral concepts.
This common-sense-based moral philosophy became the working
undercarriage of the Protestant educational enterprise in late-eighteenth,
and early- to mid-nineteenth-century America. It was characterized by three
things, two of which we have already discussed. The first was what we might
call the probabilistic, wholistic nature of reliable knowledge. This view denied
that an objective, absolute certainty on most matters relating to life and faith
was practical or even possible. Rather, it argued for a reliability, a practical
assurance, supported by certain evidences, but which also was supported by
our reason, experience, as well as moral and common sense.
The second characteristic flowed from the first, and was what we might
call the wholistic nature of reality. This was shown in the reliabilist’s willingness
to accept and consider truth claims from a variety of sources, including
26
A discussion of Witherspoon’s impressive career in outline and his influence
on Princeton and America can be found in Jeffrey H. Morrison, John Witherspoon and
the Founding of the American Republic (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 2005); George Eugene Rich, John Witherspoon: His Scottish Intellectual Background
(Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1964); L. H. Butterfield, John Witherspoon Comes to
America: A Documentary Account Based Largely on New Materials (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1953).
27
Mark A. Noll, Princeton and the Republic: 1768-1822 (Vancouver, BC: Regent
College Publishing, 2004), 45.
28
Ibid., 45.
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Scripture, reason, experience, moral sense, etc. This made the possibility of
both moral philosophy and natural law possible for a people who otherwise
had a very high regard for Scripture, and might be willing to make Scripture
the only source for spiritual and moral truths. They understood that God had
a second book, nature, which included the world, as well as human nature and
experience, through which moral principles could also be discerned.
These first two points led to a third point, which eventually split the
early Protestant Common Sense consensus in the United States, and led in
part, in my view, to the development of fundamentalism. This third point
was a doctrinal point that flowed from the first two points. If God could
communicate reliable truths through multiple sources, then one could use
these sources to understand claims made by the Bible about God. If the Bible
said that God was just, and moral, then He could be understood to be just
and moral by standards of morality and justice accessible by human reason
generally.
This conception that human reason in reflecting on nature could discern
basic moral truths, if only in crude outline, allowed for the development of a
theological view or system called the moral government of God. This system
was rooted in the free-will theology of Jacob Arminius, and was developed
by one of his disciples, the legal great and Christian apologist, Hugo Grotius.
It built on Arminius’ desire to invoke human freedom, not in order to build
up human prestige or autonomy, but to defend God’s honor and character
in not being the author of evil. Free will became the firewall, as it were, that
prevented God from being tagged, or vilified, as the cause and originator of
evil.29
Grotius built on this insight to talk about a moral government of God,
which needed to preserve God’s reputation for justice, which was the basis
of the long-term stability of his government, while also allowing him to
be merciful in forgiving sinners. He developed a theory of the atonement,
whereby God is not concerned about his personal honor or prestige, but
rather about the integrity of the government that He oversees. It is God in
His role as ruler of the universe that must provide a consistent oversight to
His system of laws upon which the universe depends.30
The Moral Government of God was an attractive model for those
influenced by Arminius, and early supporters of it included John Milton,
John Wesley, and Thomas Reid himself. Milton, as a young man, had met
and stayed with Grotius briefly in Paris, and admired his works. His Paradise
Lost, of course, was written with the specific purpose to “Justify the ways

29
Roger E. Olson, The Story of Christian Theology: Twenty Centuries of Tradition &
Reform (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1999), 467.
30
Hugo Grotius, A Defence of the Catholic Faith Concerning the Satisfaction of Christ
against Faustus Socinus, trans. and introduction, Frank Hugh Foster (Andover, MA:
Warren F. Draper, 1889).
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of God to men,” a theme that assumes that God operates a just, fair, moral
government.31
Samuel Wesley, John Wesley’s father, viewed Hugo Grotius as his favorite
biblical commentator, and he recommended him to John. The writings of
Grotius came to be a great theological resource for Wesley and his “Methodist”
friends at Oxford University.32 Methodism, which had a free will bent, and
which was influenced by the thought of Arminius and Grotius, continued to
develop its theology of God’s justice, atonement, and restoration around the
Moral Government of God model.33
Despite coming from a Calvinist, reformed background, Thomas Reid’s
Moral Government framework assumed that humans were moral, accountable
beings who possessed capacity for voluntary behavior and free will. It was
these voluntary, human wills that, for Reid, shielded God from accusations of
being the originator of evil.34
Reid specifically developed arguments about the Moral Government of
God in his lectures on natural theology.35 For Reid, a moral nature was central
to God’s being, and this expressed itself in “the Moral Government of
God.”36 “In His Moral Government,” Reid wrote, “he acts like a Legislator,
who proposes rules of conduct to his subjects and as they obey or disobey
them so may they expect his favor or displeasure.”37
The reformed tradition, Reid notwithstanding, tended to be resistant to
Moral Government claims, as they believed that it inappropriately elevated
human will and reason. But under the influence of Scottish Common
Sense philosophy and Reid, the Moral Government of God idea began to
be adopted by some prominent Calvinist thinkers in late eighteenth-century
America. The logic of the movement caused these reformed thinkers to begin
to modify notions of human choice and free will in regards to salvation.
The movement within American Calvinism began to coalesce in certain
reformed thinkers through the efforts of successors to Jonathan Edwards,
such as Joseph Bellamy and Jonathan Edwards, Jr. It was given its most
Anniina Jokinen, “Life of John Milton,” Luminarium, June 21, 2006, Accessed
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formal and extended expression, however, through the theological teachings
and writings of Nathaniel Taylor, a Yale Professor of Divinity in the early
nineteenth century.38
Taylor, a member of the Congregationalist church, modified Calvinist
views of human will and the atonement to allow for Christ’s sacrifice to make
provision for all, and for all humans to have the possibility to choose it. His
great theme, and the title of his collected lectures, was The Moral Government
of God.39
While Taylor is not a common name today, he had influence beyond
Congregationalism, and impacted a sufficient number of Presbyterians to give
rise to what has been termed New School Presbyterianism. Another leading
figure associated with this movement was Charles Finney, the lawyer turned
evangelist. Finney spearheaded much of the revivalism of the later part of
the Second Great Awakening, and helped found Oberlin College.40 Another
expositor of views like Taylor’s was the widely popular Biblical commentator
Albert Barnes, whose Biblical commentaries sold a million copies by the
1870s.41
The revivalism of the Second Great Awakening, and the modification
of Calvinism away from strict determinism and a limited atonement, caused
a pushback from various Calvinist theologians against a philosophy that they
felt gave too much room for the role of human reason and moral sentiment.
A number of these scholars were based at Princeton.
Historian Mark Noll documents the shifting emphasis in philosophy over
time at Princeton, from Archibald Alexander, who stays with Witherspoon’s
emphasis on Scottish common sense ideas, to Charles Hodge, who opposes
Finney’s revivalism and free will, and criticizes Finney’s use of reason and
appeal to common sense notions of freedom and responsibility. Hodge does
not overtly reject Scottish common-sense principles, and continues to use
what Mark Noll calls epistemological Common Sense.42
Epistemological Common Sense is the view that “our perceptions reveal
the world pretty much as it is and are not merely ‘ideas’ impressed upon
our mind.” Hodge begins to reject, however, what Noll calls ethical common
sense, “the assertion that just as humans know intuitively some basic realities
38
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of the physical world, so they know by the nature of their own being certain
foundational principles of morality.” 43
Moving away from this view that morality can be known at all from the
natural world, Hodge retreats to a use of reason tied almost exclusively to
Scripture to understand and know morality. He began to view with great
skepticism the deliverances of moral instinct and common sense that had
been part of ethical Common Sense teaching.
This tendency towards a more limited, confining, and absolute source
of truth was enhanced by Hodge’s successors, his son, Archibald Hodge, and
theologian Benjamin Warfield. It was Hodge and Warfield together who, in
seeking for a firmer and more foundational source of truth, developed the
theory of the verbal inerrancy view of Scriptural inspiration that came to
dominate fundamentalism in the early twentieth century.44
This reaction against the New Haven theology and New School
Presbyterians pushed the “Old School” Princetonians away from the
experiential evidentialism of the Scottish common sense school, which
appreciated multiple sources of truth, and relied on a practical probability
rather than an absolute certainty. It moved them toward a foundationalism
more akin to the empiricists and positivists of the rising scientism. The
difference was, of course, that the object of study would not be the natural
world, but Scripture, which would be susceptible to the methods and rigor
of science.
This story is well told by George Marsden in his classic work on
Fundamentalism and American Culture. What is less well known is the story of
the successors of the New Haven and New School Presbyterian theologies,
those that did not buy into the foundationalist, verbal inerrancy of Scripture
as the increasingly exclusive source of moral teaching.
This middle group became increasingly overshadowed by the
fundamentalist/liberal split of the early twentieth century. Groups felt forced
to choose up sides between the growing extremes, and many of them were
pushed onto the foundationalist extremes of either empiricist/experiential
liberalism or propositional/verbalist fundamentalism. My study of Adventist
history and theology convinces me that Adventists were one of the groups
that inherited and worked, at least initially, from this alternate, middle path.45
The Adventist heritage on this matter can be seen in the three areas
discussed above: reliability, multiple truth sources, and God’s Moral
Government. Importantly, each of these three topics were somewhat
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obscured for much of the twentieth century as Adventism fell into an orbit
very close to Old-Princeton-influenced fundamentalism. It then reacted
against that in the 1970s, with portions of the church heading for liberal, or
at least neo-orthodox, positions.
Let’s consider these areas in turn by looking at some examples from
one of Adventism’s primary founders, Ellen White. If we take them in
reverse order, we start with the Moral Government of God theology. It is not
surprising that Ellen White should be sympathetic to the Moral Government
of God view, given her Methodist, Arminian roots. What is unusual and
quite interesting, though, is her strong connection with the New School
Presbyterian advocates of it.
Arthur White, Ellen White’s son, wrote this of Ellen White: “as the year
1900 opened, Ellen White was dividing her time and strength between the
evangelistic interest at Maitland [in Australia] and her literary work. With this
in mind on January 1, 1900, she wrote to Edson calling for her library to be
sent to Australia:”46 This is what she wrote:
I have sent for four or five large volumes of Barnes’ notes on the Bible. I
think they are in Battle Creek in my house now sold, somewhere with my
books. I hope you will see that my property, if I have any, is cared for and
not scattered as common property everywhere. I may never visit America
again, and my best books should come to me when it is convenient.47

Given that she viewed Barnes’ commentaries as among her “best books,”
it is not surprising that they had some shared views. The views that Barnes
expresses in his commentary on Romans with the concept of the atonement
being explained in terms of God’s Moral Government is very similar to that
found in Ellen White. It is not to say that Ellen White got it from Barnes.
Indeed, it may have been that he was one of her favorite commentators
because his conceptions in this regard were very similar to hers. Here is one
quote as an example:
In the gift of his Son as a substitute and surety for fallen man, is an
everlasting testimony to the world, to the heavenly universe, and to worlds
unfallen, of the sacred regard which God has for the honor of his law and
the eternal stability of his own moral government. It was also an expression of
his love and mercy for the fallen human race. In the plan of redemption,
this Saviour was to bring glory to God by making manifest his love for the
world.48

Ellen White’s comprehensive Great Controversy theme is an expansion
and re-focusing of the Moral Government of God construct developed by
Grotius, Taylor, Barnes and others. White re-focuses it to the point where it
has two centers, the main one being God’s love, though she never loses sight
of his justice and morality. After Ellen White, one might call it God’s Moral
Government of Love.
46
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Modern oversight of the governmental aspects of God’s moral nature
causes confusion in the Adventist church over issues like the nature of
the atonement and the centrality of theodicy to questions about creation,
evolution, and suffering. A restoration of the full picture of God’s Moral
Government would help us more effectively deal with these issues as a church.
Ellen White was also very conscious and clear on the second point of
wholistic probabilism, and that is the wholistic nature of reality. She was
no dualist, and was constantly commenting on the connection between the
natural and spiritual worlds, whether it was the laws of nature in regards to
physical and mental health, or the laws of nature and morality. Far from being
a Bible-only moralist, she advocated for the study of the Protestant system
of moral philosophy.
In this regard she wrote:
The plans devised and carried out for the education of the youth are none
too broad. They should not have a one-sided education, but all their powers
should receive equal attention. Moral philosophy, the study of Scriptures,
and physical training should be combined with the studies usually pursued
in schools.49

Many Adventists reading this statement quickly and carelessly will
assume that White is referring to the moral philosophy found in the Bible.
But the list of items is obviously in the disjunctive, as physical training is
certainly different from scriptural or moral study. Further, in the nineteenth
century, the course on moral philosophy, as it had been in John Witherspoon’s
time, was taught in most Protestant colleges “as the capstone course of the
senior year of collegiate instruction,” often by the president. It was widely
understood as being the study of morals from sources of knowledge outside
the scriptures.50
Despite this inspired injunction that “moral philosophy” should be one
of the three main things studied in Adventist schools, twentieth-century
Adventism generally joined fundamentalism in rejecting any meaningful
study of moral philosophy in the twentieth century. This means that our
biblical moral insights became marooned on an island that could only be
reached by people that shared our commitment to Scripture. It also in good
part disconnected the study of the sciences and humanities from the moral
philosophical web that previously connected them with the study of divinities.
This is in part the reason for the wrestling match that takes place in
Adventist colleges and universities between the theology departments and
those of the sciences, sociology, psychology, history, and other humanities.
The common vocabulary of moral reasoning and discourse has been
49
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largely lost, and the disciplines have settled onto their general philosophical
underpinnings created by their secular professional and scholarly counterparts.
The third and final point, that of not requiring an objective, rigid certainty,
was seen in Adventism’s refusal to accept, at least ostensibly, the theory of
biblical verbal inerrancy. Despite being a conservative denomination, with
literal views of creation, Adventism did not accept, in good part due to Ellen
White’s warnings, the theory of verbal dictation. I say ostensibly, because
in their twentieth-century brush with fundamentalism, many Adventists
accepted the practice of operating and defending a kind of verbal inerrancy,
even while denying the theory.
This failure to continue with a wholistic, practical view of certainty was
the primary reason that views of inspiration of the Bible as well as that of
Ellen White were rigid and unrealistic in mid-twentieth-century Adventism. It
was this artificial view of inspiration that in turn led into the disillusionment
of many in the 1970s when confronted with the truths of the operation of
inspiration. It was this that pushed a portion of educated Adventists into
liberal or at least neo-orthodox camps.
In many ways, we still live with the fallout of that conflict in the seventies
between these two extremes. This is compounded with the challenge of
postmodernism, which seems to critique both extremes as being based on
a non-biblical, philosophically untenable, foundationalism. And indeed,
the extremes are so based. But this critique generally overlooks the other
philosophical pathway to which Adventism is truly heir, the evidentiary,
wholistic probabilism of Reid, Witherspoon, Taylor, Barnes, and Ellen White.
This is not a call to return to Scottish common-sense realism. One cannot
truly return to philosophies of the past that were constructed to deal with the
assumptions, problems, and cultures of their own time. But there are aspects
of that past that can be imported into a neo-holistic realism. The points
of practical certainty, wholistic moral reasoning based on multiple sources
subject to Scripture, and a concern for the moral government of God, can
help guide both our philosophical and theological thinking as we continue to
deal with the challenges of modernity and postmodernity. The pathway ahead
is not the same as the one behind, but we can continue to be guided by its way
markers—as a surveyor keeps one eye on his prior positioning stakes as he
continues to move forward to his ultimate goal.

